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TRASH IN THE COURTROOM: THE PROBLEM OF SOLID
WASTE CONTROL ORDINANCES AFTER HuisH
DETERGENTS, INC. V WARREN COUNTY
BENJAMIN D. ALLEN*

Americans live in a disposable society. However, the
comforts and conveniences that Americans enjoy create by-products
that cause significant problems. As solid waste output continues to
grow in the United States and across the world, federal, state and
local governments are struggling to find efficient and economically
feasible methods of disposing their solid waste, while also taking due
consideration of environmental effects and regulations.' Courts
across the United States often find trash on their doorsteps as
conflicts over local "flow control" ordinances spill into the
courtroom. Thus, courts are left with the problem of resolving these
conflicts and providing a clear framework that allows local
governments to adopt viable solid waste disposal programs. On May
31, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County2 attempted to clarify the
status of municipal solid waste programs when it struck down a local
ordinance as an impermissible discrimination against interstate
commerce. In invalidating the municipal ordinance, the court applied
the well-known precedent laid out in C & A Carbone v. Town of
Clarkstown.'
This case comment centers on the decision laid down in
Huish. Part I explains the state of the law preceding the Court's
decision. Next, Part II discusses the background facts, procedural
history, as well as the holding of Huish and compares this decision to
the prior state of the law regarding municipal solid waste control
ordinances. Finally, Part III analyzes the position of municipalities in
the post-Huish context, discussing various alternatives and
possibilities for solving the complex dilemma of solid waste disposal.
While the Huish court provided some insight into the various legal
issues regarding solid waste ordinances, it otherwise left
municipalities with a difficult path ahead of them to balance their
waste disposal needs within the ambiguous rubric of the dormant

"Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Law. B.A.
University of Kentucky, 1999; J.D. Expected, University of Kentucky, May 2002.
'See generally Maryellen Suhrhoff, Comment, Solid Waste Control and the
Commerce 2Clause: Circumventing Carbone, 7 ALB LJ. SC!. & TECH. 186 (1996).
Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, 214 F.3d 707 (6 Cir. 2000).
3
C & A Carbonev.Town ofClarkstown, 511 U.S. 114(1994).
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Commerce Clause, as well as against economic and environmental
concerns.
I.

CARBONE AND THE POST-CARBONE

ERA

A. Background
Until recently, solid waste management remained within the
realm of traditional local government functions. 4 As the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit states in USA Recycling v. Town of
Babylon,5 "for ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage
collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the
United States." 6 As disposal space for solid waste continued to
decrease, the Federal government began to become more involved in
this once traditional area of local authority.7 In 1984, Congress
amended the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 8 to
require states to adopt waste management plans in an effort to curb9
the solid waste disposal crisis that developed during the mid-1980's.
Such requirements proved difficult for smaller municipalities who
sought to promulgate such plans in light of increasingly stringent
environmental regulations that required more expensive pollution
controls.' 0 Thus, many state and local governments began looking
either toward hiring private vendors to dispose of their solid waste, or
taking the load upon themselves by providing municipal disposal
services." In order to insure the stability of such facilities, local
governments began passing "flow control" ordinances that authorized
the municipal government to require all residents and businesses to
deliver their solid waste to the local government itself or to a single
designated facility.12 The requirements contained within such "flow
control" ordinances quickly became the subject of a flood of

4

Suhrhoff, supranote 1, at 187.
'USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272 (2" Cir. 1995).
at 1275.
6Id.
7
Suhrhoff, supra note 1, at 188.
8RCRA § 6941 states:
The objectives of this chapter are to assist in developing and encouraging methods for the
disposal of solid waste which are environmentally sound and which maximize the utilization of
valuable resources including energy and materials which are recoverable from solid waste and
to encourage resource conservation. Such objectives are to be accomplished through Federal
technical and financial assistance to States or regional authorities for comprehensive planning
pursuant to Federal Guidelines designed to foster cooperation among Federal, State, and local
governments and private industry. 42 U.S.C. § 6941 (1994).
9Suhrhoff, supra note 1, at 187-188.
'Id.
"Id.
"d.
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litigation that swept into federal courts, culminating in the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Carbone.13
B. C & A Carbone and its progeny
In Carbone, the Supreme Court struck down a local "flow
control" ordinance adopted by the town of Clarkstown, New York,
that sought to insure a minimum flow of waste to a single processing
facility built as part of an agreement between the town and a local
contractor who agreed to construct and operate the facility for five
years. 14 Carbone Incorporated, a local waste hauler, sought to enjoin
the "flow control" ordinance as an impermissible restriction on
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. 15 The
Court agreed with Carbone and held that the ordinance violated the
strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause by preventing
competitors, including those from out of state, from entering the local
waste processing market.' 6 According to the majority, the disposal
17
services, not the waste itself, constituted the article of commerce.
Therefore, a state or municipality could not "hoard" such a service
market against interstate competition. The Court further noted that
there existed other less discriminatory alternatives to address
legitimate issues such as health and environmental safety, including
the implementation of uniform safety regulations. 19 As the Court
explained, "State and local governments may not use their regulatory
patronage of out-ofpower to favor local enterprise by"2 prohibiting
°
state competitors or their facilities.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Carbone opened a Pandora's
box of issues that led to challenges of municipal solid waste
ordinances and other waste management systems across the United
1
States and left municipalities in a rather ambiguous position.2 As
one author explains "[b]ecause the decision in Carbone was cast in
unusually broad terms, efforts by many communities to devise safe
and practical waste management systems and enormous public
investments in waste processing facilities are now highly vulnerable
to Commerce Clause challenges."22 Because of this vulnerable
13See generally C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
4

' 1d. at 387.
5

' 1d. at 388.
6
' 1d. at 389.
I'd. at 391
'sSeegenerallyC & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown 511 U.S. 383 (1994).

"Id.at 393.
20
1d.at 394.
21

See Colin A. Fierman, Comment, The Second CircuitUpholds Waste Management
Systems in the Wake of Carbonev. Clarkstown: The Decisionsin USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town
of Babylon and SSC Corp. v. Smithtown, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767 (1996).
'Id. at 767-768.
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position under the dormant Commerce Clause, local "flow control"
ordinances came under challenge and often fell as being
impermissibly discriminatory against interstate commerce. 23 As a
result, municipalities scrambled to reorganize their solid waste
24
management plans to conform to the broad rule laid out in Carbone.
For example, the town of Babylon, New York, which employed an
ordinance similar to the one used in Carbone prior to 1994,
reorganized its waste management system after the Court's ruling.
In an effort to avoid a Commerce Clause challenge, Babylon created
various garbage districts and implemented a contracting scheme with
local waste haulers.26 Such modifications; however, failed to halt the
increasing amount of litigation piling in front of federal courts
involving challenges to waste management plans, as the next two
cases demonstrate.
In two simultaneous decisions, 27 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit sought to distinguish the limits of the
Carbonedecision regarding local "flow control" ordinances. In USA
Recycling, the court held that a flow control ordinance enacted by the
town of Babylon requiring every garbage hauler to dispose of all
municipal waste at the town incinerator passed constitutional
muster. 28 In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished the
holding in Carbone by stating that Babylon did not create a
monopoly that excluded out-of-state competitors for the benefit of instate processors, rather, the court explained that the town completely
took over the market by providing exclusive services at the municipal
incinerator. 29 By engulfing the waste disposal market, the court
explained, Babylon was not acting as a business through selling
services to a captive consumer base, but rather as a municipal
government providing services for its residents.30 From its position
as a government provider, the court went further to explain that
Babylon's decision to hire independent contractors to perform
exclusive waste disposal services did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause.3 The court cited that Babylon, since it took over
the entire waste disposal market, acted as a market participant and
23See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 130 F.3d 731 (6 h Cir. 1997);
Atl. Coast Demolition and Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders ofAt. County, 48 F.3d
d
701 (3' Cir. 1995) (remanding the decision for review under the heightened scrutiny standard
laid down in Carbone); Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n. v. Williams, 877 F. Supp 1367 (D.

Minn. 1995).

24

See generallyFierman, supranote 21, at 767.
23USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1278 (2!"Cir. 1995).
26Id.

27See id.; See also SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502'(2"' Cir. 1995).
nUSA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1294.

at 1283.
29d.
30

1d.
311d. at 1289.
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could hire whoever it wanted to provide hauling services for the
town.32 Thus, the town's actions fell under the market participation
33

exception to the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.

In SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, the Second Circuit

affirmed the district court's decision to invalidate a municipal flow
control ordinance passed by the town of Smithtown requiring
disposal of all of the town's residential and commercial waste at a
designated incinerator as a violation of the strictures of the
Commerce Clause.34 The court distinguished its holding from that
reached in USA Recycling by citing that the Smithtown ordinance
imposed both civil and criminal penalties for those who violated its
provisions, something a market participant could not do. 35 However,
the court upheld an "improvement" contract entered into between the
town and several local contractors, giving them exclusive rights to
collection and disposal of garbage generated in the town by stating
that these actions fell under the market participation doctrine. 36 The
court reasoned that Smithtown, by accepting bids for services, hired
employees to dispose of waste rather than provide the services
itself.37 As a market participant, the town acted like a normal
business who could decide with whom it wanted to deal regarding
waste disposal services. 38 Thus, in two simultaneous decisions, the
Second Circuit attempted to distinguish and provide definition to the
broad ruling laid down in Carbone.
These cases suggest that prior to Huish, municipalities
possessed several possible methods to circumvent the Carbone
decision. "Certainly, the Second Circuit's reasoning in the two cases
provides significant leeway for communities to implement waste
After USA Recycling and SSC,
management systems. ' 39
municipalities apparently stood on safe ground if they either: (a)
owned their own disposal facilities; (b) established municipal garbage
districts or (c) acted as market participants through accepting bids for
32

1d.

33

Id.Professor Erwin Chemerinsky describes the market participation doctrine by
explaining that "... a state may favor its own citizens in dealing with government owned
business and in receiving benefits from government programs. In other words, if the state is
literally a participant in the market, such as with a state-owned business, and not a regulator, the
dormant commerce clause does not apply." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §5.3.7.2 (1997); See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 426
U.S. 794 (1976) (upholding a Maryland law that placed fewer restrictions on state residents
than on non-residents who wanted to purchase abandoned ears bought by the state government
for sale at auction).
34
SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 518 ( 2rd Cir. 1995).
35

3

Id.at 512.

at 517.
"Id.
371d.
3
B1d.
3Fieman, supranote 21, at 778.
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franchise contracts for solid waste disposal services.40 However,
municipalities continued to struggle to implement policies consistent
with the legal framework established by Carbone and its progeny.
As one author notes " . . .municipalities have little certainty as to
what actions they may take in order to secure stability in planning for
long-term disposal needs. '' 41 It is from this background that Huish
emerges in an attempt to further define this broad legal position.
II. HuisHDETERGENTS, INC. V. WARREN COUNTY

A. Background
In Huish, the Sixth Circuit found yet another opportunity to
decide the constitutionality of a local municipal solid waste
ordinance. Huish Detergents, Incorporated, an owner and operator of
a laundry detergent manufacturing facility in Bowling Green,
Kentucky,42 brought suit in Federal District Court against Warren
County to enjoin the implementation of a county ordinance that
incorporated a franchise agreement between the Bowling Green
Municipal Government and Monarch Environmental, Incorporated.43
Prior to the agreement, Warren County solicited bids from various
contractors seeking to provide collection and processing services for
the county's waste. 44 In 1995, the County accepted a bid from
Monarch and formally entered into a franchise agreement giving the
corporation exclusive rights to collect and process all municipal solid
waste generated in Bowling Green for a period of five years.45 The
agreement also required Monarch to operate the city's transfer station
and dispose of solid waste only at a Kentucky landfill. 46 Also
included within the agreement was a provision requiring that all
residents, as well as commercial and industrial entities within the
city, employ Monarch to provide their disposal and processing
services. 7 Monarch then billed each resident directly for their
services.48 On the same day that the County entered into its franchise
agreement with Monarch, it passed an ordinance incorporating the

40id.
4
"Suhrhoff, supra note 1,at 209.
42
Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren
43

County, 214 F.3d 707, 709 ( 60 Cir. 2000).
1d. at 708.
4Id.
"Id. The agreement also allowed Monarch to renew its franchise for three terms of
five years each, which automatically renewed for a five-year term absent prior notice by one of
the parties.
46d.
47-Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, 214 F.3d 707, 709 (6' Cir. 2000).
"id.
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provisions of the agreement; thus, legally requiring all residents and
businesses to dispose of their solid waste through Monarch.49
B. Procedural History
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky granted defendant Warren County's 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, holding that the County ordinance and franchise agreement
passed the strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause. 50 In reaching
its conclusion, the District Court used a similar bifurcated approach
as in USA Recycling and SSC Corp., stating that Warren County
engaged in two distinct activities: (a) a "take over" of the local waste
collection, processing and disposal markets and (b) the granting of a
franchise agreement to provide such services to the community. 51 As
to the first action, the court concluded that the County was not acting
as a market participant; thus, subjecting the ordinance to Commerce
Clause scrutiny. 52 However, the court held that the County's "take
over" of the waste disposal and processing market did not violate the
Commerce Clause because it did not discriminate against interstate
commerce. s3 The court also concluded that the burdens created by
such an action were not excessive in relation to the County's benefits,
collection and disposal of
such as the assurance of safe
54 and efficient
waste generated in the city.
The court also held that "the County acted as a market
participant in awarding an exclusive franchise to Monarch." 55 The
court reasoned that since the County took control of the waste
disposal market, it acted as a market participant in "purchasing"
exclusive waste removal services from Monarch just as any normal
business could do.56 Thus, although the facts between the cases
differed slightly, the District Court in Huish followed the bifurcated
approach laid down in USA Recycling in holding that the
scheme did not violate the dormant Commerce
ordinance/contracting
57
Clause.

491d.

-'Old.
511d.

52Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, 214 F.3d 707, 709 (6' Cir. 2000).
531d.

"'Id.
'51d.
161d
"Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, 214 F.3d 707, 709 (6&Cir. 2000).
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C. The Basis for the Sixth Circuit's Decision in Huish
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the decision of the District Court, holding that the ordinance
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.58 The court rejected the
bifurcated approach taken by the District Court, instead describing
three main issues for analysis: (a) the County's designation of a
single in-state processing station for municipal waste; (b) the decision
by the County to prohibit the disposal of city waste outside of the
state and (c) the granting of an exclusive franchise to Monarch for
waste collection and processing services.5 9
The court first disarmed the market participation argument
presented by the County, stating that it did not act as a market
participant in requiring Monarch to process all municipal waste at a
single Bowling Green site.6° The fact that the County included the
terms of the agreement in its ordinance held little relevance for the
court, which stated "[t]he market participation exception does not
come into play simply because a municipality labels its action as an
agreement. '' 6i The court further reasoned that the County was not
acting in a proprietary capacity by forcing all residents and
businesses to buy waste disposal services from a single provider
because the County did not "purchase" the services using public
funds, but rather forced those under their jurisdiction to pay for the
services themselves. 62 Thus, by using its regulatory powers to force
all city residents and businesses to purchase waste collection services
that which a private
from Monarch, the County" . . .far exceeded
63
entity could accomplish on a free market."
Without the protection of the market participation doctrine,
the court then analyzed the ordinance under the strictures of the
Commerce Clause as set out in Carbone. The court determined that
although the ordinance/franchise scheme differed from the facts in
Carbone, the County's decision to require Monarch to provide
processing services at the city's transfer station constituted the
functional equivalent of the situation present in Carbone.64 Using the
strict standard adopted in Carbone, the court held that the actions
taken by the County constituted a per se violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause because they discriminated against out of state
waste disposal service providers to the benefit of the competing in5

1d.at 716.
'91d.at 715.
"Old.

"Id.
2

h

6 Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, 214 F.3d 707, 715 (6 ' Cir. 2000).
3
6 1d. at 715-716.
"AId.at 716.
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state industry.65 The court also ruled that the County's interests in
assuring safe and efficient collection and disposal of solid waste did
not satisfy the stringent test of Carbone because other lessdiscriminatory alternatives existed to accomplish the County's goals
of safe and efficient disposal of solid waste. 6 However, the court did
not render a decision as to whether the County's designation of
Monarch as the exclusive collector of waste violated the dormant
67
Commerce Clause absent its market participant defense.
The court also concluded that the County's prohibition of
out-of-state disposal failed to survive its Commerce Clause
challenge.68 In support of this conclusion, the court explained that
the County did not act as a market participant in prohibiting out-ofstate waste disposal and even if such actions constituted market
participation, the doctrine would not insulate the County because its
regulation of the disposal market effected the downstream collection
and processing markets as well. 6 9 Thus, in rendering its decision, the
court reaffirmed the broad statement laid out in Carbone that a
municipality could not use its regulatory power to force its residents
to send its waste to a single facility. Municipalities, therefore, must
utilize other alternatives in order to achieve their legitimate goals.

M. ANALYSIS:

WHERE DO MUNICIPALITIES STAND IN THE POSTHUISH CONTEXT REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WASTE
MANAGEMENT ORDINANCES AND POLICIES?

While Huish provided some clarity to the law regarding
municipal solid waste ordinances, many municipalities continue to
find themselves on unstable ground regarding which avenues to
follow with their solid waste management programs. Huish did not
set clear boundaries within which municipalities must act, although it
implied that many options still exist for local waste management
programs.
Although the majority in Carbone did not mention the
market participation doctrine as a possibility, Justice Souter in his
dissenting opinion argued that the transfer station in controversy was
"essentially an agent" of the town. 70 Despite its rejection of the
market participation argument made by Warren County, the court in
Huish left the doctrine as a viable possibility for municipalities under
6'Id
67

Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Wanen County, 214 F.3d 707, 715 (6ThCir. 2000).
'Id. at 716.
691d.; See also, South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)

(plurality opinion).
70

C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 at 416 (1994) (Soutar, J.

dissenting).
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certain circumstances. 7' The court noted that Warren County might
have avoided the strictures of the Commerce Clause by using public
funds to pay for their disposal service, stating"... the County could
have achieved the same result, without implicating the Commerce
Clause, by hiring Monarch as its exclusive waste hauler using public
funds to pay for the service." 72 However, Warren County left its
ordinance open to an attack under the dormant73Commerce Clause by
forcing residents to "do the purchasing for it."
Critics question whether a municipality may act as market
participant once it acts in a regulatory capacity.7 4 These concerns are
of some relevance. Although a municipality participates in the
market by using public tax dollars to "purchase" collection and
processing services, private companies do not possess the authority to
promulgate ordinances that ensure a steady stream of solid waste to
their facilities. Further, the examples of market participation
provided by the Supreme Court do not involve situations such as
solid waste "flow control" ordinances.75 Ordinances such as those in
Huish and Carbone are distinguished from these Supreme Court
cases because "the goal of the market participants in the Supreme
Court cases was not economic protectionism as is the case overtly or
covertly with solid waste cases. 76 In his concurring opinion in
Huish, Circuit Judge Clay argued that the decision made by Warren
County to designate Monarch as the exclusive hauler and collector of
waste violated the Commerce Clause because it " . . .instituted a
comprehensive monopolistic scheme by which it used its regulatory
power to favor a single provider of waste removal, disposal and
processing services, and by so doing eliminated other potential local
77
and interstate waste services providers from the relevant market."
Thus, allowing a municipality to use its regulatory power to force its
residents to use the waste disposal services it "purchases," while
claiming to act as a market participant via a scheme of contracts with
local providers, appears inconsistent with the underlying principles of
the market participation doctrine as laid down by the Supreme Court.
Huish also did not discard the idea of municipal hauling of
solid waste. By collecting and disposing of the waste itself, the
"Huish, 214 F.3d at 717.
72ld.

73id
"4See Suhrhoff, supranote 1, at 212.

'5Id. at 211-212; See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976);
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (requiring that a state-owned cement plant sell its
product at lower prices to residents); White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460
U.S. 204 (1983) (requiring that all construction projects within the city receiving city funds
maintain a work force of at least fifty percent city residents).
' 6See Suhrhoff, supranote 1, at 211-212.
17Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, 214 F.3d 707, 717 (6"h Cir. 2000) (Clay,
1. concurring).
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municipality may avoid dormant Commerce Clause ramifications
through even-handed discrimination against both in-state and out of
state interests. 78 The extensive costs of such services; however,
creates substantial burdens on municipalities, many of whom prefer
to enter into contracts with private operators for their waste disposal
needs. 79 These costs are magnified when considering the limited

financial resources of smaller municipalities, such as Bowling Green.
Considering these situations, the viability of municipal hauling often
depends on the resources of the municipality, meaning that it often
fails to provide a reasonable alternative for smaller communities.
Another alternative to direct "flow control" ordinances is a
so-called "economic flow control" system that seeks to entice waste
disposal and collection providers to deliver their waste to a municipal
disposal facility.80 Municipalities could stabilize such facilities
through the issuance of bonds, as well as the implementation of new
taxes and user fees, which are fees charged to all county customers to
operate the municipal facility. 8' By supporting the municipal facility
through public funding, the local government allows such facilities to
charge competitive rates, which encourages out of state waste
disposal service providers to dispose of their waste at the municipal
facility; thus, putting such facility on a level playing field with out of
state facilities while leaving its survival up to the free market
system.8 2 While such "economic flow control" presents feasible
alternatives to larger municipalities, the same problems appear when
considering smaller towns and cities that do not have the same depth
of economic resources to take risks in a municipally owned facility.
Finally, opportunities exist in the legislative arena to provide
guidance to municipalities who seek to implement constitutional solid
waste disposal programs. 83 Because the application of the dormant
Commerce Clause upon the states remains dormant only as long as
Congress remains silent in the area, states may pressure their
representatives to support legislation authorizing state and municipal
governments to implement flow control regulations.8 4 Justice
O'Connor, concurring in Carbone, noted that Congress might
authorize "flow control" regulations that would burden interstate
nSee Geoffrey L. Oberhaus, Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause Dumps New
Jersey's Solid Waste "Flow Control" Regulations: Now What? Possible Constitutional
Alternatives to the Current "Flow Control" System, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 439, 451 (1998).
79
1d. at 453.
"Id at 459.

"ld. at 459-460.
"21d. at 463.
83See Oberhaus, supranote 78, at 472.

"id. at 472. See also, Suhrhoff, supra note 1, at 211 (advocating that Congress at
least provide authorization for pre-Carbone facilities, given their substantial commitment of
finances already made by the time of the Supreme Court's decision).
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commerce.8 5 She states, "It is within Congress' power to authorize
local imposition of flow control. Should Congress revisit this area,
and enact legislation providing a clear indication that it intends States
and localities to implement flow control, we will, of course, defer to
that legislative judgment." 6 Although the Sixth Circuit did not
address this possibility in Huish, it remains an important alternative
for advancement of municipal solid waste disposal programs.
In 1994, Congress made its most serious attempt at passing
legislation that authorized flow control on a broad basis when a bill
sponsored by New Jersey Representative Frank Pollone, Jr. passed
the House of Representatives.17 However, this bill failed to survive a
challenge in the Senate.88 In 1995, the Senate agreed upon a
compromise bill allowing communities that were using or had
already made substantial financial commitments to solid waste
disposal facilities prior to the Carbone decision to maintain flow
control regulations; however, this measure met a similar fate in the
House of Representatives. 9 Subsequent attempts to pass similar
legislation failed as small businesses and other interest groups
mounted increasing pressure in Congress against such measures.9°
Given the current amount of public pressure against "flow control"
ordinances, congressional authorization poses a possible, yet unlikely
solution to the waste disposal woes of municipalities.
IV. CONCLUSION

With a complex body of precedent in front of it, the Sixth
Circuit in Huish Detergents provided some clarity for municipalities
who seek to implement constitutional methods of providing solid
waste disposal programs that must balance public policy, as well as
economic and environmental concerns in the post-Carbonecontext.
However, Huish failed to set concrete boundaries within which
municipalities may work comfortably, meaning that they continue to
face an uncertain path ahead of them. Huish left open the possibility
that states and municipalities may continue to use the market
participation doctrine to their advantage under certain circumstances.
This raises the question whether local governments may
simultaneously regulate and behave as a participant in the market
85C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 401 (1994) (O'Connor, J.
concuring).

"Id. at 410.
8Oberhaus, supranote 78, at 472.
"Id.
$9ld; See also James C. Vago, Comment, The Uncertain Future of Flow Control
Ordinances: The Last Trash to Clarkstown?,22 N. KY. L. REV. 93, 110 (1995).
9aOberhaus, supranote 78, at 473.
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simultaneously. Such an issue poses a controversial question to the
court system that requires a determinative answer.
Other alternatives also exist to "flow control" ordinances,
such as "economic flow control" and congressional legislation.
These measures; however, pose significant feasibility problems for
smaller municipalities who lack the necessary economic resources to
risk investment in municipal facilities, and the outlook for
Congressional authorization of "flow control" measures appears
bleak at the moment. Thus, with the solid waste output of American
communities continually increasing, the court system will continue to
find trash in their courtrooms until they take action to provide a more
definite framework for such solid waste disposal plans.

